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I. Introduction
Since November 1998, the Standing Committee on Copyright Related
Rights ("SCCR") of the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") has been drafting a new Treaty on the Protection of
Broadcasting Organizations ("Broadcasting Treaty") that would provide
copyright-like protection to broadcasting entities in signatory countries.
The most recent revised draft of the Treaty, prepared by the SCCR in
Geneva in September 2006, proposes to give broadcasting organizations
the exclusive right to authorize the fixation, transmission, retransmission,
reproduction, distribution, and dissemination of a broadcast.1 These rights
would last for a period of at least 50 years from when the broadcast took
place.
The WIPO General Assembly had formerly agreed to convene a
diplomatic conference in November 2007 to update and conclude the new
Broadcasting Treaty.3 However, in light of the inability of WIPO members
to resolve fundamental disagreements over the proposed Treaty draft at the
January and June 2007 SCCR meetings, WIPO decided to cancel the
scheduled diplomatic conference.4 The delegates still agreed to consider
the protection of broadcasting organizations at the next regular SCCR
meeting.5
As currently drafted, the Broadcasting Treaty could have negative
implications for the public's use of and access to information if the U.S.
became a signatory to the Treaty. First, the Treaty could restrict the
amount of work available in the public domain. Second, the Treaty could
hinder the public's ability to legally use works in ways that are currently
1. World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on Copyright and
Related Rights, Second Revised Consolidated Text for a Treaty on the Protectionof Broadcasting
Organizations, arts. 9-15, SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), (May 2, 2005), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr12/sccr 12_2_rev_2.doc [hereinafter SCCR/15/2
(Rev. 2)].
2. Id. art. 15. While a term of 20 years has also been suggested, a majority of WIPO
member nations, including the U.S., are in favor of the longer 50-year term. See Matthew D.
Asbell, Comment and Recent Development: Progresson the WIPO Broadcastingand Webcasting
Treaty, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 349, 361 (2006).
3. Cptech.org, The Proposed WIPO Treaty for the Protection of Broadcasting,
Cablecasting, and Webcasting Organizations, http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/bt (last visited July
16, 2007).
4. Intellectual Property Watch, WIPO Broadcasting Treaty Talks Break Down,
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=664&res=1280-ff&print=0 (last visited July 15,
2007).
5. Statement by the United States Delegation (June 22, 2007), available at
http://www.usmission.ch/Press2007/0625WIPO.htm. See also Negotiators Decide to Continue
Discussions on Updating Protection of Broadcasting Organizations (June 25, 2007) [hereinafter
WIPODiscussions],
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007
/article_0039.html.
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allowed under U.S. copyright law, such as under the fair use doctrine or
with personal consumer home technology. Finally, if a similar treaty is
adopted with respect to webcasting, it could affect the free flow of
information on the Internet. These negative implications have received
little public attention to date.
This note will explore how the Broadcasting Treaty, if adopted and
implemented in the U.S., would negatively impact the public's ability to
use and access information. Part I will discuss how the Treaty would
represent a shift from the norms and traditions of U.S. copyright law. Part
II will analyze how the Treaty would negatively impact the public's use of
and access to information. Finally, Part III will propose changes that might
alleviate the Treaty's negative consequences on the public's ability to
access information.
II. Background
A. Overview of U.S. Copyright Law
The primary objective of U.S. copyright law is to confer limited
monopoly benefits to authors of original works to allow the public to
benefit from such works.6 The Constitution provides that Congress shall
have the power "to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.", 7 Copyright protection "is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." 8
Thus, an important principle of U.S. copyright law is maintaining a balance
between the author's rights and incentives with respect to their works and
the public's ability to access those works. 9

6. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("[t]he sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors").
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). See
also Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 673 (1950) (dissent, J. Traynor)
("[t]he very function of creative activity is to keep the common field in continuous germination; it
is not for copyright law to render it barren by a succession of enclosures denying access to those
who would cultivate it").
9. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (copyright
protection "reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability" of works).
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In line with these basic principles, the U.S. Copyright Act ("Copyright
Act") grants copyright protection for a limited period of time for "original
works to authorship in any tangible medium of expression."' 10 The
copyright owner has the following exclusive rights with respect to the
work: to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the copyrighted
work, to publicly perform the copyrighted work, to publicly display the
copyrighted work, and to publicly perform the copyrighted work via a
digital audio transmission (in the case of sound recordings)."
The duration of copyright protection depends on the relative date the
work was created. For works created on or after January 1, 1978 (the
effective date of the Copyright Act), the copyright lasts for the life of the
author plus 70 years. 12 For works created before January 1, 1978, but not
published or copyrighted before that date, the copyright lasts for the
duration specified under Copyright Act § 302 or the year 2002, whichever
term is shorter.' 3 Finally, for works created before January 1, 1978, that
lasts for an initial term of
had been published as of that date, the copyright
14
years.
67
of
term
renewal
a
with
28 years,
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that copyright law works in
conjunction with the freedom of expression.' 5 The proper balance between
freedom of expression and copyright protection is maintained in various
ways. First, copyright protection is granted only for a limited time, as
specified above.' 6 Second, copyright protection is only given for original
works of authorship.' 7 Finally, the copyright owner's rights extend only to
the particular means of expressing facts and ideas, but not to the ideas and
facts themselves.' 8 Other authors will "have a right to exploit the facts,
10. United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Works of authorship include the
following: literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works;
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound
recordings; and architectural works.
11. Id. § 106. Additionally, certain authors are entitled to the "moral rights" of attribution
and integrity under § 106A.
12. Id. § 302. Prior to 1997, the copyright lasted for the life of the author plus 50 years. The
copyright duration was extended for another 20 years with the passage of the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act in 1997.
13. Id. § 303.
14. Id. § 304.
15. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558-60 (2000); See
also Patricia Akester, The Draft WIPO Broadcasting Treaty and Its Impact on Freedom of
Expression (2006), at 30, availableat http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipoibt/akester042006.pdf.
16. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304.
17. Id. § 102.
18. See Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62, 63 (D. Mass. 1942) (stating that
copyright protection exists "in the arrangement and combination of the ideas, i.e., in the form,
sequence, and manner in which the composition expresses the ideas, not the ideas themselves").
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experiences, field of thought, and general ideas" that exist in the works,
"provided they do not substantially copy a concrete form, in which the
circumstances and ideas have been developed, arranged and put into
shape." 19 Also, under the merger doctrine, "courts will not protect a
copyrighted work from infringement if the idea underlying the copyrighted
work can be expressed in only one way," as the idea and the expression of
the idea are said to "merge., 20 This dichotomy between idea and
expression helps to "encourage [the] uncensored and impartial formation
and expression of opinions ' 2 1 and to ensure that the basic building blocks
of expression remain available to everyone.
B. Development of the New Broadcasting Treaty

Since 1998, the SCCR has been considering and working on a
Broadcasting Treaty that would extend copyright-like rights to
broadcasting, cablecasting, and possibly webcasting organizations. 23 The
current draft covers both "broadcasting," defined as transmission by
wireless means, and "cablecasting," defined as transmission by wire, that
will be received by the public. 24 Citing concerns over signal theft25 and
"recognizing the profound impact of the development and convergence of
information and communication technologies which have given rise to
increasing possibilities and opportunities for unauthorized use of
broadcasts both within and across borders, ' 26 the SCCR has drafted a treaty
proposing to give broadcasting organizations the exclusive right to
authorize the fixation, transmission, retransmission, reproduction,
distribution, and dissemination of a broadcast.27 These rights would be
separate from and in addition to the copyright in the underlying work, and
would last for a period of at least 50 years from when the broadcast took

19. Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
20. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). Under the related
doctrine of scenes-a-faire, courts will not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the
expression embodied in the work necessarily flows from the underlying idea (e.g., a spy novel is
expected to have elements such as a detective and spy gadgets, so those elements are
unprotectible).
21. Akester, supra note 15, at 30.
22. See Asbell, supra note 2, at 360 ("copyright aims to weigh the grant to current authors
against free public access for the benefit of future authors").
23. WIPO SCCR, Consolidated Text for a Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting
1, SCCR/l1/3,
(Feb. 29, 2004), available at
Organizations, Introductory Notes
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2004/sccr/pdf/sccr-l l_3.pdf
24. SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 1, art. 6.
25. Center for Democracy & Technology, Negotiations on Broadcast Treaty Raise
Concerns (Sept. 8, 2006), availableat http://www.cdt.org/publications/policyposts/2006/16.
26. SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 1, at Preamble.
27. Id. arts. 8-15.
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place.28 Broadcasting organizations would also have legal protection for
any pre-broadcast signals that are used to transport the broadcast material.29
The Treaty also includes language indicating national treatment for
countries who become signatories. 30 This would mean that Member
Country A would have to give the broadcasters of Member Country B the
same Treaty protections that it gives broadcasters in its own country.
The basic problem is that broadcasters may not be constitutionally
entitled to the same exclusive rights as other content creators under U.S.
copyright law. Of course, if the content of the broadcast is fixed before or
simultaneously with the broadcast itself, then the broadcasting entity would
likely have some rights over the broadcast, even though the copyright
would be thin. 31 The Treaty, however, is objectionable because it is not
explicitly limited to situations where broadcasters arrange or add content to
pre-existing works. In such cases, Congress should not "expand copyright
protection to recognize broadcasters as authors since there is not the
requisite modicum of originality in converting a work to a transmittable
signal. 3 2
C. Lack of Clear Justifications for the Broadcasting Treaty
The Broadcasting Treaty drafters have not clearly articulated the
reasons for it. 33 Even at the SCCR January and June 2007 meetings,
members could not agree on the basic objectives of the Treaty.34 Many
proponents have focused on the problem of signal theft, especially with
respect to international transmissions, as a legitimate basis for the Treaty.35
The 1961 Rome Convention already provides minimum rights for
28. Id. art. 18.
29. Id. art. 16. The explanatory comments define pre-broadcast signals as "signals that are
not intended for direct reception by the public."
30. Id. arts. 5, 7-8.
31. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
32.

Id.

33. Statement Concerning the WIPO Broadcast Treaty Provided by Certain Information
Technology, Consumer Electronics, and Telecommunications Industry Representatives, Public
Interest Organizations, and Performers' Representatives (Sept. 5, 2006), available at
[hereinafter
http://www.eff.org/IP/WlPO/broadcasting-treaty/wipo-statement-20060905.pdf
Statement Concerning the WIPO Broadcast Treaty].
34.

Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Governments Remain Divided on WIPO Broadcast

Treaty (Jan. 4, 2007), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-01-24/story3.htm (reporting
that "government negotiators were unable to reach any agreement whatsoever, and that the talks
are far from consensus even on basic issues like the objectives of the eventual treaty" at the
January 2007 meeting); see also WIPO Discussions, supra note 5 (reporting that at the June 2007
meeting, WIPO delegates "proposed that the subject of the broadcasters treaty remain on the
agenda of the SCCR, and that a diplomatic conference be convened only after agreement on
objectives, specific scope and object of protection has been achieved").
35. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25.
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broadcasting organizations to authorize or prohibit the rebroadcasting,
fixation, and reproduction of their broadcasts.36 Proponents argue that the
Rome Convention has been insufficient to protect broadcasters because it is
only concerned with the wireless transmission of analog signals and does
not include digital signals." Proponents also argue that signal piracy is "a
growing worldwide problem" as "[p]irates digitize analog broadcast signals
or copy8 digital transmissions and then upload or otherwise redistribute
3
them.
However, as compelling as these arguments may seem, federal
communications law and state competition laws already provide domestic
legal protection against signal theft in the U.S. 3 9 For international
protection, the Rome Convention and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs") both give broadcasters
some control over the fixation or reproduction of their broadcasts and
specifies national treatment among signatories.4 0 There has been little
evidence showing that these provisions have been ineffective or that the
problem of signal theft is so prevalent as to justify granting new copyrightlike rights to broadcasting entities. 4 1 Even if the issue of signal theft does
in fact require new legal attention, it is unclear how granting new
copyright-like protection to broadcasters for at least 50 years will alleviate
the problem.4 2 Furthermore, it is unclear how Treaty members will be able
to combat international signal theft when dealing with countries who are
not members, because the Treaty only provides for protection with respect

36. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations of 1961, art. 13, (Oct. 26, 1961), 496 U.N.T.S. 44 [hereinafter
Rome Convention]. The U.S. is not a signatory to the Rome Convention.
37. Asbell, supra note 2, at 350. The Rome Convention defines "broadcasting" as "the
transmission by wireless means for public reception of sounds or of images and sounds." Rome
Convention, supra note 36, art. 3. The Broadcasting Treaty would expand the definition of
"broadcasting."
38. Asbell, supra note 2, at 351.
39. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
40. Rome Convention, supra note 36, art. 2; World Trade Organization Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, arts. I and 14, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. The U.S. is a signatory to the TRIPs Agreement.
41. American Library Association, WIPO Proposed Treaty on the Protection of Broadcast
Organizations, http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/woissues/copyrightb/intlcopyright
/WIPOBroadcastTreaty.cfm (last visited March 2, 2008).
42. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25. See also Statement Concerning the
WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 33 (noting that "treaty proponents have not clearly identified
the particular problems that the treaty would ostensibly solve" and questioning "whether there are
in fact significant problems that are not addressed adequately under existing law").
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to broadcasting rights among signatories.43 It is thus difficult to understand
how the Treaty would address the problem of international signal piracy
differently than the Rome Convention or the TRIPs Agreement.
The Treaty is also problematic in that it does not differentiate between
Although the term
a signal-based and a content-based approach. 4
"broadcast" can refer to the signal itself, the content represented by the
signal, or both, the current draft of the Broadcasting Treaty makes no
attempt to define which "broadcasts" will be protected. 5 Whether the
Treaty uses a signal-based approach or a content-based approach will have
different legal implications.
A content-based approach (also referred to as the "rights-based
approach") would give broadcasters copyright-like rights in the underlying
content that they broadcast, regardless of the level of contributions the
broadcasters make to the final work (e.g., arranging video clips and adding
commentary for a news broadcast).4 6 While U.S. copyright law has
minimum requirements of originality and creativity in order to afford
authors copyright protection, 7 the Treaty does not mention any
prerequisites for broadcasters seeking the rights enumerated therein. The
Treaty also does not mention standards for determining infringements of
the broadcaster's rights; it merely states that "[c]ontracting parties shall
ensure that enforcement procedures are available under their law so as to
permit effective action against any act of infringement of rights or violation
of any prohibition covered by [the] Treaty, including expeditious remedies
to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to
further infringements. 48 It is unclear whether and to what extent violations
under the Treaty would be determined according to U.S. copyright caselaw,
which has developed tests for finding copyright infringement.4 9 Thus, as

43. SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 1, art. 7.
44. See SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 1, art. 5.
45. Akester, supra note 15, at 13.
46. See Proposalby NGOs for a Treaty on the Protection of Broadcastsand Broadcasting
http://www.eff.org/IP/
available at
2004),
4,
iii
(June
at
Organizations
WIPO/20040608_SCCRNGOBroadcasting.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression..."). See also Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("[o]riginal, as the
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity).
48. SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 1, art. 21. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. for statutory
language regarding copyright infringement.
49. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d. Cir. 1946) (for infringement suit,
plaintiff must prove "that defendant copied from plaintiff's copyrighted work" and "that the
copying ... went so far as to constitute improper appropriation"); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d
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currently drafted, the Treaty could potentially create a level of
unprecedented rights for broadcasting entities, with ambiguous standards of
enforcement.
Opponents of the Treaty recommend a signal-based approach, which
would only give broadcasters rights in the actual signal that carries the
content, thus "focusing narrowly and specifically on protecting signals
from intentional misappropriation or theft."5 ° Such an approach would
focus on the problem of signal piracy (to the extent that such a widespread
problem exists), which was the main articulated impetus behind the Treaty.
It would avoid giving broadcasting entities rights in the content embodied
by the signals, because rights in the signals alone would not give the
broadcasters rights in the underlying material being broadcast. Even if the
Treaty drafters adopt this approach, however, they should still articulate
more specific standards for determining violations of broadcasters' rights. 51
Moreover, the Treaty also "makes no effort to define, prohibit, or
otherwise directly target signal theft,, 52 which is surprising given that it is
the purported justification for the Treaty. If signal theft really is the
primary concern, a more narrowly tailored proposal could be drafted that
does not give broadcasting entities another separate layer of copyright-like
rights.53 Thus, it seems that there is merit to opponents' arguments that the
Treaty "is not focused on signal protection," but rather "premised on the
creation of intellectual property rights in the recording and subsequent use
of fixed transmissions. 5 4
The rationale for the new Broadcasting Treaty is similar to former
proposals to provide sui generis protection to elements of databases,

1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (permit finding of infringement when plaintiff shows substantial
similarity in underlying ideas (extrinsic test) and substantial similarity in expression (intrinsic
test)). Caselaw has defined the level of copying that will constitute infringement. See, e.g.,
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d at 473 (holding that similarities between the compositions of plaintiff
and defendant were too "trifling" to direct a verdict for defendant); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1985) (holding that defendant's verbatim quoting of
300-400 words from President Ford's memoir constituted infringement and did not constitute fair
use).

50. Statement Concerning the WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 33.
51. For a proposed revision of the Treaty using a signal-based approach, see Proposalby
NGOsfor a Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasts and Broadcasting Organizations,supra note
46.
52. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25.
53. See
Silicon.com,
Copyright
Tussle
Looming
Over
Online
Video?,
http://management.silicon.com/government/O,39024677,39162123,00.htm (last visited July 16,
2007).
54. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Position Paper on the Proposed WIPO Broadcasting
Treaty (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/bt/EFF-position.jan07.pdf (last
visited Mar. 2, 2008).
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including the 1996 WIPO treaty on databases that ultimately failed.55
Neither the Broadcasting Treaty nor the database treaties seek protection
for original work, but rather seek "protection for investments needed to
gather, organize, and disseminate the work., 56 The Supreme Court has
held that in order to qualify for copyright protection, a compilation must, at
a minimum, feature "an original selection or arrangement" of data.57 Thus,
copyright does not extend to compilations that lack originality. Moreover,
it may be difficult or even impossible for database creators to recoup their
investments, given that pure data is uncopyrightable and databases
themselves are readily searchable.58 According to Dov S. Greenbaum,
while the government should support the growth of databases, "the social
benefit created by maintaining a healthy public domain, and not privatizing
information and facts, far outweighs the benefits provided by the database
industry, and any subsequent loss of revenue or market" with the
implementation of a strict copyright regime for databases. 59 Similarly, the
Broadcasting Treaty could threaten the "copyright mandate" of promoting
"science, discovery, and the growth of the public domain,, 60 because it
creates an additional layer of intellectual property rights that will
negatively affect the public's ability to use and access works. Copyright
should be used to protect creativity-not signals that do not meet the
minimum threshold of creativity.
D. Broadcasting Treaty Represents Substantial Shift from U.S. Copyright
Norms
Even if the proponents' justifications for the necessity of the
Broadcasting Treaty are acceptable, the Treaty is still problematic in that it
represents a substantial shift from U.S. copyright norms. In a recent letter
55. James Love, Note on the Proposed WIPO Treaty for Broadcasters, Cablecastersand
Webcasters (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/casting-note290ct03.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2008); Akester, supra note 15, at 36. The text of the proposed
1996 WIPO databases treaty is available at http://www.bitlaw.com/source/treaties/database.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2008). Opponents of the Broadcasting Treaty have also argued that the Treaty
could extend protection to databases.
56. Love, supra note 55. Love also argues that there is no "economic or moral rationale" to
providing investment-based protection to the transmissions of works that are not created by the
broadcasting organizations themselves.
57. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). See
also 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976)(defining the scope of copyright in compilations and derivative

works).
58. Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 2003).
59. Dov. S. Greenbaum, Commentary: The DatabaseDebate: In Support of an Inequitable
Solution, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 431, 515 (2003). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright,
Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U.
CIN. L. REv. 151 (1997).
60. Greenbaum, supra note 59, at 435.
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to the Register of Copyrights and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary advised that the terms
of the current draft of the Broadcasting Treaty "would needlessly create a
61
new layer of rights that would disrupt United States copyright law. '
Since the U.S. never joined the Rome Convention, "[t]he potential impact
of the new treaty in this country would be much greater than a simple
modernization or extension of existing legal rights. 62 First, granting
copyright-like protection to broadcasting organizations would violate the
originality requirement of the Copyright Act.63 U.S. copyright law awards
protection for the creation of original works, not for the dissemination of
works created by others. Since the Broadcasting Treaty neither defines any
standards of originality that broadcasters must meet as a prerequisite to
obtaining rights over their broadcasts, nor limits rights to physical signals,
the Treaty could give protection to unoriginal broadcast signals and allow
broadcasters to gain their own additional rights over the broadcast
content. 64 This grant of a "copyright-like right over plainly unoriginal
information runs directly counter to the Copyright Clause's originality
requirement,, 65 and gives middlemen transmitters copyright protection that
has traditionally been reserved for creators.
Implementation of the Broadcasting Treaty would also violate the
principles of originality established in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., Inc., where the Supreme Court rejected the "sweat
of the brow" doctrine that accorded copyright protection based solely on
the effort expended to compile data.66 The Court further held that
copyright protection extends only to the author's original components in
the work.67 Although compilations "may possess the requisite originality"
61. Letter from Patrick Leahy, Chainnan of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and
Arlen Specter, Ranking Republican Member, to Hon. Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights,
and Hon. Jon Dudas, Director of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Mar. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docsbroadcast-treaty.pdf.
62. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25.
63. Adam R. Tarosky, The Constitutionality of WIPO's Broadcasting Treaty: The
Originalityand Limited Times Requirements of the Copyright Clause, DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 16
(2006). Tarosky argues that "[b]ecause the Broadcasting Treaty creates an unlimited term of
copyright-like protection for unoriginal information, it would likely be unconstitutional if
implemented under the Copyright Clause." Tarosky further notes that although Congress could
theoretically implement the Treaty under the less restrictive Commerce Clause, such
implementation should not be allowed because the Constitution should be viewed as "an
integrated document," and where "other enumerated powers contain limitations (like the 'limited
times' language of the Copyright Clause) the danger of eradicating these limitations from the
Constitution is great."
64. Id. at 14.
65 Id. at 15.
66. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991).
67. Id. at 348.
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required for copyright protection, they still need to possess a "minimal
degree of creativity" in order to qualify for copyright protection. 68 It is
difficult to imagine broadcast signals meeting this minimum threshold of
creativity, even though broadcasting entities admittedly have to expend
effort to transmit the signals.
In addition to violating the originality requirement, the Broadcasting
Treaty would violate the limited times requirement of the Copyright Act
because the broadcaster's right could potentially last indefinitely.69 Article
18 of the current draft grants a term of protection "until the end of a period
of 50 years computed from the end of the year in which the broadcast took
place., 70 This provision could easily be circumvented, because when a
broadcaster's rights are about to expire, the broadcaster could "simply
rebroadcast the segment and obtain another fifty years of protection,"
which would "effectively lock up the content of the broadcast
indefinitely.'
Moreover, even if the time provision in Article 18 is meant
to limit protection only to broadcast signals that occur once, "a given piece
of content ... could be rebroadcast via a different signal," thereby allowing
the broadcaster to gain another 50-year term of protection.72 Such a system
could have very negative consequences on accessibility to information,
which will be discussed in Part III, infra.
III. Analysis
In addition to having an unclear purpose and representing a shift away
from U.S. copyright norms, the Broadcasting Treaty could have significant
negative impacts on the public's ability to use and access information. The
public's use of and access to information is essential to individual and
collective freedom of expression, which is part of the vital foundation for
our democratic society.73 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
"freedom of thought and speech 'is the matrix, the indispensable condition,
of nearly every other form of freedom.' 7 4 The Supreme Court has also
noted that the Framers of the Constitution "intended copyright itself to be

68.

Id.

69.

Tarosky, supra note 63, at 16.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
(quoting

SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 1, art. 18.
Tarosky, supra note 63, at 16.
Id. at 17.
Akester, supra note 15, at 27.
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass., Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986)
Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)).

20081

"SIGNALING" NEW BARRIERS
",75

the engine of free expression.
Thus, limiting the public's ability to use
and access information would not only go against well-established
copyright principles, but would also undermine a basic premise of our
democracy-a democracy that promotes the maintenance of a robust
marketplace of ideas.
There are three main ways in which the Broadcasting Treaty threatens
to negatively impact the public's ability to use and access information.
First, the Treaty could restrict the amount of work available in the public
domain. Second, the Treaty could hinder the public's ability to legally use
works in ways that are currently allowed under U.S. copyright law, such as
under the fair use doctrine or with personal consumer home technology.
Third, if a similar treaty is adopted with respect to webcasting, it could
affect the free flow and access to information on the Internet.
A. Restriction of Works in the Public Domain
As mentioned previously, copyright protection is given to authors of
original works for a limited period of time. Once the copyright expires,
however, the work passes into the public domain, and the right to copy (and
to copy without attribution) goes to the public as well. 76 This reflects the

ultimate goal of the copyright regime-to encourage the creation of
original work for "the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts. 77 However, the Broadcasting Treaty
would allow broadcasters to secure their own additional rights in public
domain material simply by re-broadcasting the work.78 Furthermore, it
could conceivably be difficult to differentiate between transmission signals,
so that "one might have to rely on the content alone to determine if there
was an infringement., 79 This could limit the types and amount of work that
are accessible in the public domain because broadcasters could restrict
access to these works even after the copyrights have expired. Works in the
public domain "might thus become proprietary, and public no more. 80

75. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). See also
Akester, supra note 15, at 30 ("the Supreme Court has taken the view that copyright works side
by side with freedom of expression, complementing it rather than opposing it").
76. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (quoting
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)).
77. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
78. Akester, supra note 15, at 42 (noting that the "Broadcasting Treaty would enable
broadcasting and cablecasting organizations to control materials that are in the public domain by
transmitting them").
79. Asbell, supra note 2, at 361.
80. Id. Such concerns also apply to works that creators want to disseminate without
restrictions. Furthermore, some content owners believe that the broadcasting entities are using
the Treaty to expand their control over the retail exploitation of content. See Love, supra note 55.

HASTINGS COMmv/ENT L.J.

[30:533

8
For example, consider a broadcast of the movie "Finding Nemo," '
which is currently covered by a U.S. copyright held by Disney.
Theoretically, the movie and its broadcast would pass into the public
domain once Disney's copyright expires. Under current law, personal
recordings made from past broadcasts of the movie could be transmitted
lawfully via the Internet, and future broadcasts could be recorded and
shared.82 However, a broadcaster could get Disney's permission to
rebroadcast the movie at any time, and in doing so, could gain its own
separate and additional rights over Nemo, Dory, and all their other aquatic
friends. Furthermore, if the Treaty takes a content-based approach, as
opposed to a signal-based one, all broadcasters who re-broadcast the movie
would gain exclusive additional rights to authorize the fixation,
transmission, retransmission, reproduction, distribution, and dissemination
of the movie's content, even though they had nothing to do with its original
creation. Anyone who wanted to use the broadcasts of the movie would
have to get permission from the broadcasting entities, even after Disney's
original copyright expired.8 3 Furthermore, even Disney itself could
theoretically rebroadcast its works to extend its own copyright.84
Such a system could allow broadcasting organizations to control the
use of works despite their public domain status, which contradicts the
ultimate goal of providing copyright protection in the first place-to ensure
that a broad range of works are available for public use. 85 It seems quite
out of line with the public interest to allow broadcasting entities to restrict
access to works that are already in the public domain simply because they
have broadcast the work via a "quite un-extraordinary signal., 86 As
currently drafted, there are no express exceptions to preserve access to
materials that are not protected by copyright, such as "orphan works"
where a copyright holder cannot be found, or works that are in the public

81.

FINDING NEMO (walt Disney Pictures 2003).

82. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25.
83. Many treaty opponents have also noted that the Broadcasting Treaty would make the
copyright system in general more complicated, time-consuming, and expensive because of the
addition of broadcasting entities as new rights holders. See, e.g., id. In addition to obtaining
copyright clearance from the copyright owner of the original work, a person would also have to
obtain clearance from the broadcasting entity.
84. However, if the Treaty takes a signal-based approach, then rebroadcasting would not
extend to the copyright in the underlying content.
85. It has also been noted that the Treaty's provisions may pose serious risks for developing
countries, where traditional broadcasting via television and radio are the most important means of
providing access to information. See Marcia Aribela & Viviana Munoz, The Proposed
Webcasting Treaty: What Implicationsfor Access to Knowledge? (Sept. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.a2kbrasil.org.br/ENGfThe-Proposed-WIPO-Broadcasting (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
86. Tarosky, supra note 63, at 14.

20081

"SIGNALING" NEW BARRIERS

domain. 87 If the U.S. implements the Broadcasting Treaty and does not
provide appropriate exceptions for public domain material, the
implementation "could further diminish
the availability of public domain
88
information and compilations of data.,
B. Limitations on the Fair Use Doctrine
While a copyright owner has the exclusive rights of reproduction,
adaptation, distribution, public performance, and public display with
respect to the original work, these rights are subject to the fair use
exception embodied in Section 107 of the Copyright Act. 89 The statutory
formation of the fair use defense reflects Congress' intent to codify the
common law doctrine, which traditionally defined fair use as "a privilege in
others than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent.' 90 According to Section 107, "the
fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 91 In making
a determination of whether the use of a work in any particular case
constitutes a fair use, courts will consider the following factors: (1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of92
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Courts are to explore this list of non-exhaustive factors and weigh them
together "in light of the purposes of copyright," bearing in mind that 93the
overall purpose is "to encourage 'creative activity' for the public good.,
The implementation of the Broadcasting Treaty could chill the
exercise of fair use, one of the broadest and most important exceptions to
copyright protection. For example, consider a teacher who wants to use a
portion of a science program recorded from a television broadcast as part of
87. Akester, supra note 15, at 41.
88. American Library Association, supra note 41. The ALA is also concerned about the
impact of the Treaty on libraries' use of broadcast materials.

89.

17 U.S.C. §§ 106-107 (1976).

90.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (2000) (quoting H.

BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). The opinion also recognizes

that the fair use doctrine is necessary for promoting science and the useful arts because it allows
subsequent authors to improve on previous works.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
92. Id.
93. Video Pipeline Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198 (3d Cir.
2003).
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her curriculum. This might constitute lawful fair use under current
copyright law.94 However, unless the Treaty includes exceptions that
precisely track current fair use provisions in the U.S., the adoption of the
Treaty would mean that the teacher would still need to seek authorization
from the broadcaster of the program.9 5 Moreover, even if the Treaty
includes the same fair use provisions, "the existence of a second rights
holder would effectively double the number of parties who could challenge
the assertion of fair use and tie up matters in costly litigation." 96 Thus, the
teacher may simply decide to forego using the recorded science program in
the classroom, even though it probably would not have presented a legal
problem under the current fair use exceptions.
In addition to this educational example, an individual could make fair
use of a work in many other ways under current U.S. copyright law.
Parody is an acceptable use of an original work because it must mimic
enough of the original work in order for its audience to recognize the
parody itself.97 Portions of audiovisual works may also be used
legitimately in new original works.98 Fair use of such works is also
important in light of the increase of user-generated content, especially on
the Internet. 99 Many individuals are now creating audiovisual works by
combining prior broadcasts or webcasts with their own new material and
posting them on websites such as YouTube 100
and MySpace for the purposes
of education, entertainment, or commentary.
By giving broadcasting entities an extra layer of intellectual property
rights, the Broadcasting Treaty would create an additional rights holder that
could challenge the fair use of works. Since content users already face a
complex process when trying to clear traditional copyright protections,
"adding more complexity to the clearance process will inhibit innovative
uses of content." 10
'
Furthermore, the addition of a second rights holder

94. 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as . . .
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use) ... is not an infringement of copyright").
95. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25.
96. Id.
97. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268 (2001). See also
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (for a decision holding that parody,
like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use defense under § 107 of the Copyright Act).
98. See, e.g., Monster Commc'ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 494-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (where the makers of Muhammed Ali documentary who used short clips of a
boxing match film successfully asserted fair use defense, because the portions taken from the film
were small and the purpose for behind the use was informational).
99. See Silicon.com, supra note 53.

100. Id.
101. Statement of Intel Corporation Concerning the World Intellectual Property
Organization's Proposed Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations (Apr. 2006),
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increases the potential of litigation. This could effectively discourage
people from making fair use of works, to the ultimate disadvantage of the
public. 102
C. Limitations on Use of Consumer Technology
The Broadcasting Treaty also raises concerns because "the broad
scope of the proposed rights, combined with proposed additional rights
regarding technological protection measures in connection with these
rights, raises questions about whether [broadcasting entities] would gain
the ability to control signals in the home or personal network
environment."'' 0 3 Digital technology has brought about new services and
transmission techniques that allow for innovative forms of presenting and
distributing broadcasts.10 4
Some of these services are combining
interactive elements with traditional broadcast elements, so that a "return
path" for transmissions is created between the user and the broadcasting
entity. 10 5 For example, personal television programs, such as TiVo, are
equipped with electronic program guides and the capacity to store many
hours of television programs. 10 6 The system enables the viewer to
automatically record programs for later viewing, to skip commercials in a
program, and to pause and continue a program from the same point in the
program. 10 7 Such innovative services are now an important part of
consumer home technology.
However, under the current draft of the Broadcasting Treaty,
broadcasters and cablecasters could potentially gain control over "how their
transmissions may be handled within a user's home or personal networkincluding whether home electronics devices may record, retransmit, or
otherwise manipulate the signals."' 1 8 This would give broadcasters and
cablecasters the authority to approve or reject the use of innovative
consumer electronics devices, such as TiVo, that allow users to manipulate
transmitted signals in their own homes.' 0 9 In a December 2006 letter
available at http://lists essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2006-April/001 165.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2008)[hereinafter Intel Statement].
102. Id.
103. Statement Concerning the WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 33. See also SCCR/15/2
(Rev. 2), supra note 1, art. 19 for the proposed obligations concerning technological measures.
104. UNI-MEI, Report on Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (May 2002),
availableat http://www.unionnetwork.org/unimei.nsf/4efl 85159c616af8c 1256ada004698c9/
adc9f76eaae876c8c1256bc8004b8610/$FILE/report.pdf. (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25.
109. Id.
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seeking support from U.S. copyright officials, Daryl Hatano, Vice
President of Public Policy for the Semiconductor Industry Association,
wrote: "New [intellectual property] rights for broadcast signals may impede
consumers from benefiting from semiconductor technology advances
because granting such new rights raises questions about whether
[broadcasters] would gain the ability to control signals in the home or
personal network and would thus interfere with the rollout of broadband
and home and personal-networking services.""l 0
Such rights are
unprecedented under current U.S. copyright law and would greatly impede
on individual users' ability to employ personal technological devices."'
This could also increase consumer costs and reduce technological
innovation. 1 2
In light of these concerns, many major technology companies have
urged WIPO to limit the scope of the proposed Broadcasting Treaty, in an
effort to avoid paying a new tier of royalties for material beyond what is
already due to the content owners.'1 3 Opponents have also urged that the
Treaty should include a provision excluding the coverage of signal
fixations, transmissions, or re-transmissions over a home or personal
network."1 4 In light of the broad language in the current draft of the Treaty,
such an exception could help to alleviate the concerns of technology
companies and users.
D. Restriction of Information on the Internet

Finally, extension of rights for broadcasting entities to the Internet
context may severely restrict the free flow and access of information on the
Internet. This topic has sparked much "domestic debate about the balances
' 5
sought by copyright and the centralized regulation of the Internet.""
While the current draft of the Broadcasting Treaty provides rights to
broadcasting and cablecasting organizations, proponents are seeking to
extend similar rights to webcasters, largely due to effective lobbying by the

110. Rick Merritt, Broadcast Royalty Bid Roils Major Companies, ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERING TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007. These technology companies are also concerned that
intermediaries, such as software developers and Internet service providers, could be held liable
for copyright infringement of broadcast signals that use their systems.
11.
Cf Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (using fair
use analysis, the Supreme Court held that the sale of home videotape recorders did not constitute
contributory infringement of television program copyrights).
112. Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 54.
113. Merritt, supra note 110. For a discussion of compulsory copyright licensing schemes in
the U.S., see 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976)(exceptions for secondary transmissions); Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, Dir., Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 467 U.S. 691, 696 (1984).
114. Statement Concerning the WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 33.
115. Asbell, supra note 2, at 349.
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Digital Media Association, which represents Yahoo! and other digital
media organizations.'1 6 Due to major disagreement on this issue, the
current text of the Treaty does not contain any explicit reference to rights
for webcasters."l Instead, the SCCR created the separate "Working Paper
on Alternative and Non-Mandatory Solutions on the Protection in Relation
to Webcasting," which focuses on the web-related issues from the original
draft of the Treaty. 18 The purpose of a separate proposal for webcasting
was to put the issue on a slower track than that proposed for the
Broadcasting Treaty. l l9 According to the Working Paper: "webcasting"
means the making accessible to the public of transmissions of sounds or
images or of images and sounds or of the representations thereof, by wire
or wireless means over a computer network at substantially the same time.
Such transmissions, when encrypted, shall be considered as "webcasting"
to the public by the
where the means for decrypting are provided
1 20
webcasting organization or with its consent.
The Working Paper further defines "simulcasting" as "the
simultaneous and unchanged webcasting by the broadcasting organizations
of their own broadcasts."' 2 1 There is some debate over whether the
proposed definitions of webcasting would be limited to live streaming
animations, other
audio and video, or if it would extend as far as Flash
1 22
themselves.
websites
to
even
or
recordings,
streaming
Since the definitions and provisions expressed in the Working Paper
are absent from the current draft of the Broadcasting Treaty, they must
somehow be incorporated into the text of the Treaty in order to take
effect. 123 The SCCR proposes three alternative solutions in the Working
Paper for incorporating the webcasting provisions into the Treaty. 124 The

116. Id. at 352.
117. Id. See also SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 1, art. 5.
118. Asbell, supra note 2, at 352; WIPO SCCR, Working Paper on Alternative and NonMandatory Solutions on the Protection in Relation to Webcasting, SCCR/12/5 Prov., (Apr. 13,
2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr_12/sccr 12_5_prov.pdf
[hereinafter Working Paper].
119. Robert Bauer, Webcasting Removed from WIPO Broadcasting Treaty, 3 No.1 ABA
SciTech Law. 25 (2006).
120. Working Paper, supra note 118, at 7. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office also
submitted a "netcasting" definition to the WIPO SCCR on August 1, 2006, which is available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/wiponetcasting-aug2006.pdf.
121.

Working Paper, supra note 118, at 8.

122. Asbell, supra note 2, at 354-55. Compare Love, supra note 55 (noting that "the entire
world wide web" could plausibly be covered by the proposed definitions and urging for a
clarification on this point) with Working Paper, supra note 118, cmt. 1.06, at 6 (suggesting a less
extensive interpretation).
123. Asbell, supra note 2, at 353.
124. Id.
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first alternative solution seeks to reintroduce the webcasting provisions as
terms to which Treaty signatories can opt in by notifying WIPO.'25 The
second alternative solution proposes to include the webcasting provisions
automatically in the Treaty, while allowing nations to opt out if they
choose.126 The third alternative solution attaches the webcasting provisions
as a protocol to the Treaty, "treating it as a distinct legal text subject to
ratification, accession, or adhesion by the participants."1 27 The third
solution, which "would effectively make webcasting a separate aspect of
the [T]reaty to which parties could individually sign on at any date on or
after ratification" of the Broadcasting Treaty, 2 8 seems to be the best
alternative because it would allow countries to more carefully consider the
effects of the webcasting provisions before taking any action.
Concerns that broadcasting organizations might also be granted rights
in the Internet context are understandable in light of the importance of the
Internet as a source of information, communication, and entertainment.
The Internet has become a "flourishing world" of user-generated media
content, which is a manifestation of "freedom of expression in the online
world. 12 9 If broadcasters are able to control the transmissions and retransmissions of their broadcasts on the Internet, it could create new
obstacles to the robust flow of information online. 130 For example,
consider a copyright holder with rights in a work that has been broadcast
who affirmatively wants to permit the widespread redistribution of the
work, yet lacks the technical capacity to do so. Current U.S. copyright law
would permit people to record the broadcast and to circulate the work on
the Internet according to the copyright holder's wishes. 131 However, if the
webcasting provisions are adopted, the broadcaster could bar or limit such
circulation, effectively becoming "the gatekeeper for a work that otherwise
could be freely distributed."' 3 2 The existence of another rights holder may
also add further confusion to the already complicated copyright clearance
process.

125. Id. See also Working Paper, supra note 118.
126. Asbell, supra note 2, at 353.
127. Id. at 354.
128. Id.
129. Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 54.
130. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25. Some developing countries are
widen the digital divide between developed
also worried that "the inclusion of webcasting will ...
and developing countries." See Choike.org, WIPO: Developing Countries Oppose Webcasting in
Broadcast Treaty, http://www.choike.org/nuevo-eng/informes/4342.html (last visited July 17,
2007).
131. Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 25.
132. Id.
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While there has been much opposition to the Broadcasting Treaty's
application to the Internet, 33 the current webcasting provisions in the
Working Paper seem to have more narrowly drafted rights than some
opponents have suggested. The explanatory comments indicate that the
definition of webcasting is intended to be limited to the "accessibility of
real-time streaming that may be received by several receivers at the same
time," so that the user "may log in to the program flow at a given point in
time and receive what follows but cannot influence the program flow
otherwise." 134 Also, the webcasting provisions do not seem to require
countries to provide expansive rights to all website operators. 135 Seth
Greenstein, who serves as outside counsel to the Digital Media
Association, said that the intended "scope of coverage is Internet
Webcasting that is like broadcasting, not individual files, songs, audio or
video clips made on individual Web sites, but rather programming that is
scheduled."'' 36 However, in light of the Treaty's possible negative effects
on the flow of information on the Internet, the SCCR should clearly
articulate limitations on the webcasting provisions so that there are no
unnecessary restrictions on the public's ability to access information
online.
IV. Proposal
Even if signal piracy is a legitimate concern that should be addressed
with a new WIPO Broadcasting Treaty, such an instrument should focus
narrowly on preventing signal theft rather than simply granting "a long list
of exclusive rights without taking into account the balance between the
different groups-broadcasting organizations, producers, authors, and
performers."' 37 Moreover, any need to address signal piracy should be
balanced against the possible effects on the public's ability to use and
access information, which is "crucial in promoting the dissemination of
knowledge and [the] production of more creative works.' 38 In light of the
possible negative implications of the Broadcasting Treaty discussed above,
this note will conclude with several suggestions on how to alleviate some

133. See, e.g., Statement Concerning the WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 33.
134. Working Paper, supra note 118, at 6, cmt. 1.06. See also American Library Association,
supra note 41.
135. American Library Association, supra note 41.
136. Anne Broache, Copyright Treaty Draws Tech Industry Criticism (Sept. 5, 2006),
availableat http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6112532.html.
137. UNI-MEI, supra note 104.
138. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"),
Protection of the Rights of Broadcasting Organizations (Apr. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.ipjustice.org/WlPO/UNESCO- 17 1_EX_59.pdf.
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of these concerns if the Treaty must truly be adopted and implemented in
the U.S.
First, the Treaty should specify a signal-based approach, as opposed to
a content-based approach, so that it can address the narrow issue of signal
theft without granting broadcasting organizations new extensive rights in
the content embodied in the signals. "This separation between [the]
content and [the] content-carrying signal is crucial for maintaining a proper
balance between the rights of copyright holders as creators of works, and
broadcasters as transmitters., 139 Such a distinction is vital in light of the
fact that U.S. copyright law affords protection to creators of works, not
mere transmitters of works. Furthermore, a lack of clarity on the
distinction between content and signal will lead to
legal uncertainty in the
40
infringement.
constitute
would
what
about
future
Second, exceptions for public domain works should be implemented.
Broadcasting and cablecasting entities should not be allowed to control
works in the public domain merely by transmitting or retransmitting them.
Article 17 of the current Treaty draft permits, but does not require,
signatories to grant limitations and exceptions to broadcasters' rights in
"special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
broadcast and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
broadcasting organization."'' 41 It should be noted that while this language
seems broad and permissive, an equivalent provision in both the Berne
Convention and the TRIPs Agreement has been construed relatively
narrowly. 142 In fact, in 2001, a World Trade Organization arbitration panel
used this language to find the U.S. out of compliance with its obligations
under the TRIPs Agreement when it amended Section 110(5) of the
Copyright Act to exempt more business from liability for the public
performance or display of copyrighted, non-dramatic musical works (also
known as "the business exemption"). 143 In particular, the amendment
allows for the public performance of copyrighted music on commercial
139. Id.
140. Akester, supra note 15, at 13.
141. SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 1, art. 14.
142. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2), July
24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 40, art. 13.
143. 17 U.S.C. §I 10(5)(B). The amendment was known as the Fairness in Music Licensing
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, 2830. See also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86
(1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5700. The WTO panel issued a judgment of $1.1
billion a year owed to European musicians by the U.S. Craig W. Mandell, Balance of Powers:
Recognizing the Uruguay Round Agreement Act's Anti-Bootlegging Provisions as a
Constitutional Exercise of Congress 's Commerce Clause Authority, 54 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 673, 716, n. 283 (2007). However, the U.S. delayed by asking for multiple
extensions to change its legislation. Id. The case is still currently tied up on the grounds of
procedural objections to the WTO arbitration. Id.
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premises, such as restaurants
and bars, without payment of royalties to the
44
copyright owners. 1
The WTO panel engaged in the following interpretive analysis: (1) the
language of "certain special cases" requires that a limitation or exception in
national legislation be clearly defined and narrow in its scope and reach;
(2) "normal exploitation" of works affects the rights of those who use the
works without authorization from the rights holders; and (3) "prejudice to
the legitimate interests of rights holders reaches an unreasonable level if an
exception or limitation causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable
loss of income to the copyright owner." 145 The panel determined that the
business exemption did not qualify as a certain special case, conflicted with
a normal exploitation of works,
and unreasonably prejudiced the legitimate
46
interests of rights holders. 1
However, even if the language of Article 17 of the Treaty will be
construed as narrowly as similar language in the TRIPs Agreement, it still
creates some level of uncertainty for many legitimate users who may not be
overly familiar with copyright laws. 147 Thus, more specific language
focusing on the protection of public domain works should be added to the
Treaty to reduce the "risk of privatization of information and knowledge
148
currently in the public domain.''
Third, the Treaty should include express exceptions that follow the
language of the fair use exception under U.S. copyright law. The fair use
doctrine is one of the broadest exceptions to the rights of copyright holders,
and broadcasting entities should not have the right to limit the application
of the doctrine to legitimate, fair uses of material. If appropriate exceptions
are not adopted, the implementation of the Treaty could increase copyright
clearance costs as well as litigation risks. This would chill the exercise of
fair use and reduce the number of "works that build upon, reinterpret, and
reconceive existing works,"'' 49 as well as the number of users who
disseminate the works for the purposes of education or commentary.
144. 17 U.S.C. §I 10(5)(B); Katherine L. McDaniel, Accounting for Taste: An Analysis of
Tax-and-Reward Alternative Compensation Schemes, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 235, 303
(2007). To qualify for this new exemption, businesses could not charge their patrons a fee to view
or hear the transmissions, and these transmissions could not be rebroadcast.
145. Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R,
at
6.112, 6.186,
6.229 (June
15, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org
/english/newse/news00_e/1234da.pdf. See also McDaniel, supra note 144.
146. Panel Report, supra note 145. at 6.133, 6.211, 6.266. For a general discussion of the
effects of the WTO panel's approach to lawmaking, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie and
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPs and the Dynamics ofIntellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 99-100 (2004).
147. Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 54.
148. UNESCO, supra note 138.
149. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Fourth, the Treaty should adopt provisions excluding the coverage of
signal fixations, transmissions, or re-transmissions over a home or personal
network.
Without such exceptions, both technology companies and
consumers will be negatively affected. Finally, considering the potential
restrictions to the free flow of information on the Internet, the separate
webcasting provisions should not be adopted.
To the extent that
webcasters must be granted similar monopoly rights, the definitions and
provisions adopted should be narrowly tailored. For example, the
provisions could limit protections to real-time streaming and certain types
of (as opposed to all) website operators. Even "[i]f there has to be an
understanding of broadcasters' rights, it must at the very least ensure that it
promotes access to knowledge and its dissemination in the digital
environment." 150
As currently drafted, there is a great danger that the Broadcasting
Treaty will harm "the balanced set of exceptions and limitations in [U.S.]
copyright law to access information for legitimate purposes."' 5'1 The
changes proposed above would make the Broadcasting Treaty more
tailored to its stated purpose of fighting signal theft, and would also better
recognize "the need to maintain a balance between the rights of
broadcasting organizations and the larger public
interest, particularly
52
education, research and access to information."'
V. Conclusion
In sum, the articulated reasons for the proposed Broadcasting Treaty
do not seem to justify granting a new separate layer of copyright-like rights
to broadcasting organizations for 50 years. The Treaty would introduce a
new layer of intellectual property rights that would be separate from, and in
addition to, the rights of copyright holders, thus impacting the rights of
both copyright owners and of the public at large. 153 Specifically, the Treaty
could restrict public access to information by (1) limiting the amount of
work available in the public domain; (2) obstructing the public's ability to
use works under the fair use doctrine or with personal consumer
technology; and (3) restricting the flow of information on the Internet.
In light of these possible negative implications of the Broadcasting
Treaty, this note suggests some possibilities on how to alleviate some of
these concerns if the Treaty must truly be adopted and implemented in the
U.S. First, the Treaty should use a signal-based approach, rather than a
150.
151.
152.
153.

UNESCO, supra note 138.
Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 54.
SCCR/15/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 1, Preamble.
UNESCO, supra note 138.
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content-based approach, so that it can address the narrow issue of signal
theft without granting broadcasting organizations new extensive rights in
the content embodied in the signals. Second, the Treaty should include
express exceptions for public domain works and the fair use of works.
Third, the Treaty should adopt provisions excluding the coverage of signal
fixations, transmissions, or re-transmissions over a home or personal
network. Finally, the separate webcasting provisions should not be
adopted, or if they are adopted, they should be narrowly tailored to ensure
that there are no unnecessary restrictions on the public's ability to access
information online.
The purpose of copyright protection, as reflected in the Constitution,
'1 54
is "to foster the growth of learning and culture for the public welfare."
Even if broadcasting organizations must be given new rights to protect their
signals, they should not be allowed to unduly restrict the public's ability to
access and use information, which would ultimately be a detriment to our
society.

154. MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 396 (2nd ed.
2001). See also Akester, supra note 15, at 31 ("restrictions to copyright in favour of
dissemination of information promote access to information, knowledge and culture").
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